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Summary
The State Department’s new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization (S/CRS) is intended to address longstanding concerns, both within
Congress and the broader foreign policy community, over the perceived lack of the
appropriate capabilities and processes to deal with transitions from conflict to
sustainable stability.  These capabilities and procedures include adequate planning
mechanisms for stabilization and reconstruction operations, efficient inter-agency
coordination structures and procedures in carrying out such tasks, and appropriate
civilian personnel for many of the non-military tasks required.  Effectively
distributing resources among the various executive branch actors, maintaining clear
lines of authority and jurisdiction, and balancing short- and long-term objectives are
major challenges for designing, planning, and conducting post-conflict operations.
The Bush Administration has presented the 109th Congress with two funding
requests for S/CRS and related projects.  In the February FY2005 supplemental
appropriations request, it has asked for $17.2 million for S/CRS operations.  Of this,
$9.4 million is for the initial stand-up costs of the office and $7.8 million is requested
for the development of a rapid response cadre of State Department personnel and for
the design of a training program and civil-military exercises for them.  The House
version of the FY2005 supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 1268) contains $3
million for S/CRS; the Senate Appropriations Committee version contained $7.7
million, but in floor action on April 13, the Senate amended that to the full request.
The Bush Administration’s FY2006 budget request includes $24.1 million for
the S/CRS operations, including the creation of 54 new positions in the office and the
establishment of the 100-person “ready-response” cadre within the Department of
State.   The unit’s members would be selected from the foreign service and civil
service personnel and would be specially trained for post-conflict response missions.
Once trained, members would continue to serve in positions in regional and function
bureaus, but would be available for deployment as “first responders” when an
intervention occurs.  In addition, the Administration asks for the creation in FY2006
of a $100 million no-year contingency Conflict Response Fund that would be
administered by S/CRS and could be used “to prevent or respond to conflict or civil
strife in foreign countries or regions, or to enable transition from such strife.” 
On March 10, 2005, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported its
version of the Foreign Affairs Authorization Act for FY2006 and FY2007 (S. 600).
Sections 701-711 incorporate a slightly modified version of the Lugar-Biden
Stabilization and Reconstruction bill of 2004 (S. 2127, 108th Congress) and the
version of that bill reintroduced on January 31, 2005 as S. 209.  These sections
would: (1) create a statutory basis for S/CRS and its functions,  and provide the
Senate with power over the appointment of the S/CRS head; (2) provide authority
and funding for a Readiness Response Corps; (3) provide the President with broad
authority for conducting post-conflict response operations, and; (4) provide authority
for the establishment of a $100 million emergency fund to conduct such operations.
This report will be updated.
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1 “Peacekeeping” is a broad, generic, and often imprecise term to describe the many
activities that the United Nations and other international organizations, and sometimes ad
hoc coalitions of nations or individual nations, undertake to promote, maintain, enforce, or
enhance the possibilities for peace.  These activities range from providing election
observers, recreating police or civil defense forces for the new governments of those
countries, organizing and providing security for humanitarian relief efforts, and monitoring
and enforcing cease-fires and other arrangements designed to separate parties recently in
conflict. (Many of these activities are often also referred to as “nation-building;” a better
term some analysts suggest is “state-building.”)  As used here, the term encompasses both
“peace enforcement” operations, sent to enforce an international mandate to establish peace,
and “peacebuilding” activities.  Peacebuilding activities, usually undertaken in a post-
conflict environment, are designed to strengthen peace and prevent the resumption or spread
of conflict, including  disarmament and demobilization of warring parties, repatriation of
(continued...)
 Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions:
Background and Congressional Action on
Civilian Capabilities
Introduction
President Bush’s pledge, articulated in his February 2, 2005, State of the Union
address, “to build and preserve a community of free and independent nations, with
governments that answer to their citizens, and reflect their own cultures” casts the
once-discredited concept of building or rebuilding government institutions,
economies, and civic cultures in a new light.   During the 1990s, many policymakers
considered the establishment of new institutions in troubled countries to be an overly
expensive, if not futile exercise.  The use of U.S. military forces for such  activities,
particularly in the first half of the decade, was troubling to many members.  Now,
however, the Bush Administration has proposed dramatic changes in U.S.
governmental structures to enable the United States to perform such tasks more
efficiently and at a lesser cost, particularly in transitions from conflict and in post-
conflict situations.  A key component of these changes is the establishment of civilian
structures and forces.
Several factors have combined since 9/11 to substantively change views on
desirability and relative costs of nation-building, as well as on the need to create new
and improve existing civilian institutions to carry it out.  Foremost among these
factors is the widespread perception since 9/11 that global instability directly
threatens U.S. security and that it is a vital U.S. interest to transform weak and failing
states into stable, democratic ones.  Related to this is the expectation that responding
to the threat of instability will require the United States and the international
community to intervene periodically in foreign conflicts with “peacekeeping”1 and
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1 (...continued)
refugees, reform and strengthening of government institutions, election-monitoring, and
promotion of political participation and human rights.
2 S. 600 is a slightly modified version of the freestanding Stabilization and Reconstruction
Civilian Management Act of 2004 (known as the “Lugar-Biden bill”), which was first
introduced by Senators Lugar and Biden on February 25, 2004 (S. 2127, 108th Congress),
and reintroduced by Senator Lugar on January 31, 2005 (S. 209).  The original companion
measure was H.R. 3996 (108th Congress), introduced by Rep. Schiff on Mar.  18, 2004; no
companion measure has yet been introduced in the 109th Congress.  Other bills dealing with
civilian capabilities issues in the 108th Congress were:  The Winning the Peace Act of 2003
(H.R. 2616 introduced by Rep. Farr on Jun. 26, 2003); the International Security
Enhancement Act of 2004 (H.R. 4185, introduced by Rep. Dreier on Apr. 21, 2004); and the
United States Assistance for Civilians Affected by Conflict Act of 2004 (H.R. 4058
introduced by Rep. Hyde on Mar. 30, 2004).
“stabilization” forces at about the same intensive pace as it has done since the early
1990s.  Because that pace has stressed the U.S. military, many policymakers believe
that the United States must create and enhance civilian capabilities to carry out the
peacebuilding tasks that are widely viewed as necessary for stability and
reconstruction in fragile, conflict-prone, and post-conflict states.  Finally, numerous
analyses distilling the past decade and a half of experience with multifaceted
peacekeeeping and peacebuilding operations have raised hopes that rapid,
comprehensive, and improved peacebuilding efforts can significantly raise the
possibilities of achieving sustainable peace.   
The 109th Congress faces a number of issues regarding the strengthening of
civilian capabilities for peacekeeping and post-conflict operations.   The first is
whether to fund fully and put into permanent law the State Department Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and its operations.  S/CRS
is the centerpiece of the Bush Administration’s efforts to improve the United States’
ability to function effectively on the world scene in the post-9/11 environment.
Created in mid-2004, S/CRS was tasked with designing, and in some cases
establishing, the new structures within the State Department and elsewhere that
would allow civilian agencies to develop effective policies, processes, and personnel
to build stable and democratic states.  The second issue is whether to authorize and
fund two new mechanisms that would “operationalize” the State Department, i.e.,
transform it from an institution devoted to diplomacy to one that would effect change
through “on-the-ground” personnel and programs dedicated to promoting security
and stability in transitions from conflict and post-conflict situations.  
Legislation introduced in the 109th Congress would provide S/CRS with
statutory status and authorities for its operations and would provide funding to
expand S/CRS substantially beyond its current staff of 37.  It would also create a 250
person rapid response force, and a no-year, $100 million, automatically replenishable
emergency fund.  All these points are contained in the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee version of the FY2006 and FY2007 Foreign Affairs Authorization Act
(S. 600).2  
No specific legislation has been introduced thus far in the 109th Congress
regarding international civilian police (also known as “CivPol”).  CivPol was the
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3 For more background and information on the development of international CivPol
capabilities and issues regarding U.N. and U.S. CivPols, see CRS Report RL32321, Policing
in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions.
4 This Background section and the following section on S/CRS’ Current Missions and
Activities largely reproduce the contents of a previous CRS Report RS22031, Peacekeeping
and Post-Conflict Capabilities: The State Department’s Office for Reconstruction and
Stabilization.
5 The term “post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization” is broad but is usually understood
to encompass tasks and missions to promote security and encourage stable, democratic
governance and economic growth following major hostilities.  In the past, many of the
“stabilization” activities were loosely labeled “peacekeeping.”  (See footnote 1.)
Reconstruction involves repairing (in some cases creating) the infrastructure necessary to
support long-term economic growth and development. This infrastructure can be physical
(e.g., roads and schools), or institutional (e.g., legal and tax systems) For additional
background on various aspects of post-conflict reconstruction and assistance, see CRS Issue
Brief IB94040, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military
Involvement, CRS Issue Brief IB90103, United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress,
and CRS Report RS21819, World Bank Post-Conflict Aid: Oversight Issues for Congress.
subject of proposed legislation in the 108th Congress.  Some analysts advocate
continued efforts to improve the United States’ ability to deploy qualified CivPol,
both for its own operations and as contributions to U. N. CivPol deployments.
Among the improvements they recommend are the standardization of hiring criteria
and  practices, and the creation of an ample and highly-qualified ready-reserve of pre-
trained U.S. CivPol, containing personnel with many different policing skills.3  (The
U.S. CivPol program is managed by the State Department’s Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.  Although CivPol is one of the civilian
capabilities needed for stabilization operations, there is no indication of any intention
for  S/CRS to assume direct responsibility for this program.) 
Background4
Evolving Perceptions of Post-Conflict Needs 
The creation of S/CRS  in July 2004 responded to increasing calls for the
improvement of U.S. civilian capabilities to plan and carry out post-conflict
operations.  Post-conflict operations are complex undertakings, usually involving the
participation of several United Nations departments and U.N. system agencies, the
international financial institutions and a plethora of non-governmental humanitarian
and development organizations, as well as the military and other departments or
ministries of the United States and other nations. 5   The United States developed its
contributions to the earliest international “peacekeeping” operations of the 1990s on
an ad hoc basis, with little inter-agency planning and coordination, and often with the
U.S. military in the lead.  The military was called upon to perform such missions not
only for its extensive resources  but also because no other U.S. government agency
could match the military’s superior planning and organizational capabilities.  In
addition, because of its manpower, the military carried out most of the U.S.
humanitarian and nation-building contribution, even though some believed that
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6 The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations:
Presidential Decision Directive.  May 1997. [http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm].
7 U.S. Text: The Clinton Administration White Paper on Peace Operations. February 24,
2000 [http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-71-4.htm], hereafter referred to as PDD-71
White Paper; and U.S. Text:  Summary of Presidential Decision Directive 71,
[http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-71-1.htm].  
8 See CRS Report RL32321, Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations:
Problems and Proposed Solutions.
9 Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke “Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies,”
World Bank Working Paper, Oct. 2002.
civilians might be better suited to carry out such tasks, especially those involving
cooperation with humanitarian NGOs.  
During the 1990s, many analysts began to perceive the need to improve and
increase civilian contributions to peacekeeping operations, especially for those
activities related to planning and conducting operations and to establishing a secure
environment.  An important Clinton Administration initiative was the May 1997
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, entitled The Clinton Administration’s
Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations.  According to the white
paper explaining it, PDD 56 sought to address inter-agency planning and
coordination problems through new planning and implementing mechanisms.6  Due
to what some analysts describe as internal bureaucratic resistance, PDD 56’s
provisions were  never formally implemented, although some of its practices were
informally adopted.  The Administration also attempted to remedy the shortage of
one critical nation-building tool, international civilian police forces, through PDD 71,
which a white paper describes as outlining policy guidelines for strengthening
criminal justice systems in support of peace operations.7  While never implemented
by the Clinton Administration, PDD 71 has been partially put into force by the Bush
Administration.8   
Improvements in the provision of social and economic assistance are also
viewed as crucial to successful outcomes.  Post-conflict populations need “safety net”
and poverty alleviation programs, as well as technical assistance and advice on
monetary and fiscal policy and debt management in order to create an environment
conducive to democratization and economic growth.9   While the popular image of
U.S. post-conflict assistance is the post-World War II Marshall Plan, through which
the United States provided the foreign assistance needed for Europe’s post-conflict
reconstruction, multilateral institutions became increasingly important during the
1990s, when small, regional conflicts proliferated following the collapse of the
Soviet Union.  International organizations such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund now play crucial roles, working with the U.S.
government to provide economic assistance and technical advice on rebuilding  post-
conflict economies.  (Nevertheless, although the United States has provided some
funding for economic reconstruction multilaterally for the recent Afghanistan and
Iraq operations, most U.S. funding for post-conflict operations  is provided
bilaterally.)  Many analysts now judge that multilateral assistance is more effective
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10 Milner, Helen, “Why Multilateralism? Foreign Aid and Domestic Principal Agent
Problems,” available at [http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/seminars/pegroup/milner.pdf], and
Schiavo-Campo, S., “Financing and Aid Arrangements In Post-Conflict Situations,” World
Bank Working Paper, May 2003.
11 Alesina, Alberto and Dollar, David, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” NBER
Working Paper No. w6612, Jun. 1998.
12 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004, and On the
Brink: A Report of the Commission on Weak States and US National Security, sponsored by
the Center for Global Development, May 2004.
13 Prins, Gwyn, “AIDS and Global Security,” International Affairs, Vol. 80, Issue 5, 2004.
for the recipient country than bilateral aid for two reasons.10  First, disbursing funds
multilaterally through U.N. agencies or international organizations gives greater
assurance that it will reach recipients than providing aid bilaterally with direct
payments to individual governments or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In
addition, analysts find that bilateral aid is more likely to be apportioned according to
the donor’s foreign policy priorities rather than the economic needs of the recipient
country.11  
 
For many analysts and policymakers, the ongoing Iraq operation illustrates a
U.S. government need for new planning and coordination arrangements that would
provide a leadership role for civilians in post-conflict phases of military operations
and new civilian capabilities to augment and relieve the military as soon as possible,
and greater international coordination.  The perception of a continuing need for such
operations, and the perceived inefficiencies of the still largely ad hoc U.S. responses
have reinvigorated calls for planning and coordination reform.  The Bush
Administration’s reluctance to use military forces for nation-building tasks and the
extreme stresses placed on the military by combat roles in Iraq and Afghanistan have
pushed those calls in a new direction, to the development of adequate civilian
capabilities to perform those tasks.
Calls for Change
The perception that international terrorism can exploit weak, unstable states has
convinced many policymakers of the need to strengthen U.S. and international
capabilities to foster security, good governance and economic development,
especially in post-conflict situations.  Most recently, the 9/11 Commission and the
Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security12 have judged weak states,
as well as unsuccessful post-conflict transitions, to pose a threat to U.S. security.
Such states often experience economic strife and political instability that make them
vulnerable to drug trafficking, human trafficking and other criminal enterprises, and
to linkage with non-state terrorist groups (such as the links between the previous
Taliban government in Afghanistan and the Al Qaeda terrorist network).  Weak states
also are unprepared to handle major public health issues, such as HIV/AIDS, that can
generate political and economic instability.13  These commissions argued for
assistance to the governments of weak states and of post-conflict transitions regimes
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14 The reports are: (1) Play to Win:  The Final Report of the Bi-partisan Commission on
Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the
Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA), 2003 (a book-length version was published in mid-
2004, Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Robert
C. Orr, ed.); (2) Clark A. Murdock, Michèle A. Flournoy, Christopher A. Williams, and Kurt
M. Campbell, principal authors. Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New
Strategic Era Phase I Report, CSIS, Mar. 2004; (3) Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson,
eds.   Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, National Defense
University Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Apr. 2004, (4) On the
Brink: Weak States and US National Security, Center for Global Development, May 2004;
and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and From Hostilities, Dec.
2004.
15 PDD-71 White Paper, op.cit., p 6.
to help them control their territories, meet their citizens’ basic needs, and create
legitimate governments based on effective, transparent institutions.
These and other studies recognize a need to enhance U.S. government structures
and capabilities for conducting post-conflict operations.14  Although differing in
several respects, the studies largely agree on five points:  (1) the current ad hoc
system needs to be replaced with a permanent mechanism for developing contingency
plans and procedures for joint civil-military operations led by civilians;  (2)
mechanisms to rapidly deploy U.S. civilian government and government-contracted
personnel need to be put in place;  (3) preventive action needs to be considered;  (4)
the U.S. government needs to enhance multinational capabilities to carry out post-
conflict security tasks and to better coordinate international aid; and (5) flexible
funding arrangements are needed to deal with such situations.  Major differences
concern the placement of a permanent planning and coordinating structure, the
emphasis given to rule of law (i.e., police, judicial and penal personnel) vs.
economic/reconstruction aid, and the attention paid to preventive measures.
Proposals for New Civilian Forces.  A prominent part of many of these
reports was the recommendation to develop rapidly-deployable civilian forces (i.e.,
point #2 above) to undertake “nation-building” functions, particularly those related
to rule of law, even before hostilities had ceased.  Many analysts view the early
deployment of rule of law personnel as essential to providing security from the outset
of an operation, which they argue will enhance the possibilities for long-term stability
and democracy in an intervened or post-conflict country.  In 2000, the Clinton
Administration’s PDD-71 on strengthening criminal justice systems in peace
operations identified such an initiative as a high priority, according to the PDD 71
White Paper.   That white paper states PDD 71 instructed that “programs must be
developed that enable the U.S. to respond quickly to help establish rudimentary
judicial and penal capacity during peace operations and complex contingencies.”15
Many view the development of civilian groups to do so as permitting the earlier
withdrawal of military personnel than would otherwise be possible.  Subsequent
documents have envisioned specially-organized civilian units.
Four recent studies have endorsed the creation of cohesive, rapidly-deployable
units of civilian experts for stabilization and reconstruction operations.  
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16 Transforming  for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, op.cit.
17 Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 1 Report,
op.cit. See pp 64-65.  
18  Robert M. Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?  America’s Search for
a Postconflict Stability Force.  Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press,
2004.  See pp 323-337 for an extensive discussion of this proposal.
19 Transition to and From Hostilities, op.cit., p 58.
! The November 2003 report of the National Defense University
(NDU) recommended the concurrent deployment of civilian
“stabilization and reconstruction” personnel with combat forces, in
order to expedite the transfer of nation-building responsibilities to
civilians.  The report recommends the creation of a standing
interagency stabilization and reconstruction team within the
government, and the development of an “on-call” civilian crisis
management corps of medical, legal, language, and law enforcement
personnel from state and local governments and the private sector.16
! The March 2004 report of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) recommended the establishment of an Agency for
Stability Operations reporting directly to the Secretary of State.  The
agency would be responsible for preparing for such operations, as
well as the management and deployment of Civilian Stability
Operations Corps of 200-300 U.S. government civilians, who are
organized, trained and equipped for conducting such operations, and
of a Civilian Stability Operations Reserve of an unspecified number
of non-government civilians with related expertise who would be
on-call for rapid deployment.17  
! A U.S. Institute of Peace analyst has recommended the creation of
a “U.S. Stability Force” comprised of  (1)  robust military forces, (2)
civilian constabulary units, (3) civilian police, and (4) rule of law
professionals (lawyers, judges, and corrections experts) that would
deploy concurrently in order to provide the needed security from the
outset.18  
! The Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on transitions from
hostilities recommends that the Department of State “develop and
maintain a portfolio of detailed and adaptable plans and capabilities
for the civilian roles in reconstruction operations” and that it
“prepare, deploy, and lead the civil components of the reconstruction
missions...”  The study finds that the civilian police, judges, civil
administrators, and technical advisors are needed to help build new
institutions after a military intervention.19
The establishment of such a corps would be a substantial change from current
practices.  The United States deploys Civilian Police (contracted separately for each
operation) to international peacekeeping and stabilization operations through the
CRS-8
20 For more discussion on issues regarding CivPols, constabulary police, and rule of law
personnel, see CRS Report RL32321, Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability
Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions.
21 Information in this section on S/CRS’ status and activities was provided by various
officials of S/CRS.
22 Posture Statement of General Richard B. Myers, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, before the 109th Congress.  Senate Armed Services Committee, Feb. 17, 2005, p. 31.
as posted on the Senate Armed Services Committee website.
State Department’s CivPol program, run by the Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement (INL). The United States currently deploys other rule of law
personnel, with experience in justice and corrections systems, through Department
of Justice contracts, funded by INL.  (The State Department’s civilian police program
requests contractors to identify such personnel in an effort to create a capability
within the CivPol to deploy them.)  To many analysts, however, the current system
does not provide the full range of necessary personnel in a timely manner.  A major
shortage if the role of the military is to shift at the end of major combat operations
from combat to providing perimeter security is the lack of  constabulary units which
would take responsibility for internal security, either military or civilian.  The
availability of personnel for rapid deployment may well depend on the arrangements
under which they are recruited.  If, as with the U.S. military reserve component, law
enforcement and rule of law personnel are to commit to deploy immediately when
called, they may require the type of benefits (e.g., pension, salaries for regular
training) such as members of the U.S. military reserve component receive. Some also
argue the need for improvements in the U.S. CivPol system.20  
S/CRS’ Current Mission and Activities21
S/CRS is currently comprised of 37 individuals from the State Department and
on detail from other U.S. government agencies.  Congress first endorsed the creation
of S/CRS in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005 (H.R. 4818, P.L. 108-
447).  Section 408, Division D defined six responsibilities for the office, the first five
of which respond to the first need — for a readily-deployable crisis response
mechanism — stated above.  The U.S. military is supportive of S/CRS’ creation and
its mission.  In his prepared statement for testimony before the Armed Services
committees in February 2005, General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, cited the creation of S/CRS as “an important step” in helping “post-
conflict nations achieve peace, democracy, and a sustainable market economy.”  “In
the future, provided this office is given appropriate resources, it will synchronize
military and civilian efforts and ensure an integrated national approach is applied to
post-combat peacekeeping, reconstruction and stability operations,” according to
General Myers.22 
As legislated by P.L. 108-447, S/CRS’ functions are (1) to catalogue and
monitor the non-military resources and capabilities of executive branch agencies,
state and local governments, and private and non-profit organizations “that are
available to address crises in countries or regions that are in, or are in transition from,
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conflict or civil strife;” (2) to determine the appropriate non-military U.S. response
to those crises, “including but not limited to demobilization, policy, human rights
monitoring, and public information efforts; (3) to plan that response; (4) to
coordinate the development of interagency contingency plans for that response; and
(5) to coordinate the training of civilian personnel to perform stabilization and
reconstruction activities in response to crises in such countries or regions;” and (6)
to monitor political and economic instability worldwide to anticipate the need for
U.S. and  international assistance.
The office is developing proposals on how to enable the U.S. government to
more effectively respond to crises and carry out all these activities.  Two of the
proposals concern the development of more integrated and coherent groups of
personnel to respond to crises.  The first would create a “Response Readiness Corps”
of existing and additional U.S. government personnel which would facilitate the
transition from military to civilian leadership on the ground and to manage more
effectively civilian resources in the post-conflict environment.  It would be comprised
of  three units: (1) a diplomatic response group to establish diplomatic operations in
crisis response efforts, to participate in peace negotiations, and to develop
relationships with transitional governments and liaise with international
organizations, (2) a technical group to design and manage transitional security and
governance programs, and (3) an advance civilian team of staff from S/CRS and from
diplomatic and technical groups to deploy with military forces at the beginning of an
intervention in order to assume stabilization responsibilities, freeing up military
personnel for other tasks.  S/CRS is also working with the Joint Forces Command on
a feasibility study for a “Civilian Response Corps” to assess possible options for the
development of a reserve of retired government personnel, and personnel from state
and local governments, private for-profit companies and non-profit NGOSs to carry
out rule of law and reconstruction activities.  
S/CRS has already begun instituting mechanisms to carry out some of its
responsibilities.  To monitor potential crises, S/CRS has asked the National
Intelligence Council (NIC) to provide it twice a year with a list of weak states most
susceptible to crisis, from which S/CRS chooses one or more as test cases to prepare
contingency plans for possible interventions.  S/CRS is also working with the USAID
Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, which is developing techniques for
preparing highly-detailed assessments of current and impending conflicts.  To better
plan and carry out response efforts, S/CRS is developing a system to collect, analyze,
and transmit “lessons learned.”  To address the need for greater interagency,
particularly civil-military, planning and coordination, S/CRS is working with the
military to develop, among other things, civilian-military training exercises for
stabilization and reconstruction operations and a common template for civil-military
stabilization and reconstruction planning.  
 
In two related areas necessary to carrying out Congress’ mandates, S/CRS has
also taken a role.  First, it has begun to develop ties with other international
participants to coordinate and enhance civilian capabilities for stabilization and
reconstruction activities.  S/CRS also is seeking to help State Department regional
bureaus (which have the lead on preventive activities) to develop concepts and
proposals for preventive action.  
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Bush Administration Funding Requests and
Congressional Action
FY2005 Supplemental Appropriations
As the S/CRS was created in mid-2004, well after the FY2005 budget request
was submitted, the Administration has requested substantial S/CRS funding as
FY2005 supplemental appropriations.  The February 2005 supplemental
appropriations request asks for $17.2 million for S/CRS operations.   
Of this amount, $9.4 million is for the initial stand-up costs of the office.
According to the request, this sum is intended to cover salaries of an initial staff of
45 and support costs (including information technology), and funding for planning,
studies, and services.  It will also pay for the creation of a database of U.S.
government capabilities and of communications software that would allow U.S.
government agencies to share information among HQs personnel and those serving
abroad in remote locations.  (The State Department’s FY2006 Congressional Budget
Justification cites S/CRS funding levels for FY2004 as $536,000, and for FY2005
and FY2006 as $737,000 each year.)
The other $7.8 million is requested for the initial development in FY2005 of a
rapid response cadre of State Department personnel and the design of a training
program and civil-military exercises.  The FY2006 budget request (see below) asks
for funds to establish the cadre.
Congressional Action.  The House Appropriations Committee reported the
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror,
and Tsunami Relief, 2005 (H.R. 1268) on March 11, 2005; its accompanying report,
H.Rept. 109-16 stated that the bill contained $3.0 million for S/CRS. No explanation
was given for not including the remaining funds requested by President Bush.  Funds
were not added in subsequent House floor action.  As reported April 6, 2005, the
Senate Appropriations Committee version of  H.R. 1268 (S.Rept. 109-052), contains
$7.7 million, $1.7 million less than the $9.4 million requested for initial stand-up
costs.  S.Rept. 109-052 states that the Committee “expects [the] funding to support
additional personnel requirements in Washington and Sudan.”  The report states that
the Committee does not include the $7.8 million requested for the active response
unit, but that as “costs and programs of these new activities are better identified, the
Committee will consider any proposed reprogramming of funds.”  In floor action on
H.R. 1268 on April 13, the Senate approved by unanimous consent a Lugar-Biden
amendment to provide the full $17.2 million of the President’s request for S/CRS as
emergency supplemental appropriations.
FY2006 Annual Budget Funding
The Bush Administration’s FY2006 budget request includes $24.1 million for
the S/CRS operations, including the creation of 54 new positions in the S/CRS office
and  the establishment of a 100-person “ready-response” cadre within the Department
of State.   If approved by Congress, the “ready-response” units members would be
selected from the foreign and civil service and would be specially trained for post-
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conflict response missions.  Once trained, members would continue to serve in
positions in regional and function bureaus, but would be available for deployment as
“first responders” when an intervention occurs. 
In addition, the Administration asks for the creation in FY2006 of a $100
million no-year contingency Conflict Response Fund that would be administered by
S/CRS and could be used “to prevent or respond to conflict or civil strife in foreign
countries or regions, or to enable transition from such strife.”  This amount has been
requested several times previously in annual budget and supplemental appropriations
requests.  As outlined in the President’s FY2006 budget request, the Secretary of
State could use the Conflict Response Fund “to prevent or respond to conflict or civil
strife in foreign countries or regions” or to facilitate the transition from such strife.
The Administration seeks legislative authority for an exceptional degree of flexibility
for the fund.  Its proposed legislative language would not only exempt the application
of  any restriction in law for the use of the Conflict Response Fund, but also would
permit the use of additional resources for countries receiving support from the Fund
without regard to restrictions elsewhere in legislation. 
 
Other Legislation and Congressional Action
Foreign Affairs Authorization Act for FY2006-FY2007 (S. 600)
On March 10, 2005, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported an
authorization bill (S. 600) for foreign relations and for the conduct of foreign affairs.
Sections 701-711 incorporate a slightly modified version of the Lugar-Biden
Stabilization and Reconstruction bill of 2004 (S. 2127, 108th Congress) and the
version of that bill reintroduced on January 31, 2005 as S. 209.  The provisions of
this section would serve four functions.  They would:
! Create a statutory basis for S/CRS and its functions,  and provide the
Senate with power over the appointment of the S/CRS head;
! Provide authority and funding for the creation of a Readiness
Response Corps of active duty government personnel and
contractors;
! Provide broad authority for conducting post-conflict response
operations, and;
! Provide authority for the establishment of an emergency fund to
conduct such operations.
Make the Office of the Coordinator Permanent Law.  The provisions
of Section 706 would codify the existence of S/CRS by amending Title 1 of the State
Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651 et.  seq.), which, among
other functions, provides for the establishment of the higher level positions within
the Department of State.   Section 706 states that the Coordinator should have the
rank and status of Ambassador-at-Large, and be appointed by the Secretary “by and
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23 These functions are:  (1) “Monitoring, in coordination with relevant bureaus within the
Department of State, political and economic instability worldwide to anticipate the need for
mobilizing United States and international assistance for the stabilization and reconstruction
of countries or regions that are in, or are in transition from, conflict or civil strife;” (2)
“Assessing the various types of stabilization and reconstruction crises that could occur and
cataloging and monitoring the non-military resources and capabilities of Executive agencies
that are available to address such crises;” (3) “Planning to address requirements, such as
demobilization, policing, human rights monitoring, and public information, that commonly
arise in stabilization and reconstruction crises;” (4) “Coordinating with relevant Executive
agencies (as that term is defined in section 105 of title 5, United States Code) to develop
interagency contingency plans to mobilize and deploy civilian personnel to address the
various types of such crises;” (5) “Entering into appropriate arrangements with other
Executive agencies to carry out activities under this section and the Reconstruction and
Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2005;” (6) “Identifying personnel in State and
local governments and in the private sector who are available to participate in the Response
Readiness Corps or the Response Readiness Reserve ...or to otherwise participate in or
contribute to stabilization and reconstruction activities;” (7) “Ensuring that training of
civilian personnel to perform such stabilization and reconstruction activities is adequate and,
as appropriate, includes security training that involves exercises and simulations with the
Armed Forces, including the regional commands;” (8) “Sharing information and
coordinating plans for stabilization and reconstruction activities with the United Nations and
its specialized agencies, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, nongovernmental
organizations, and other foreign national and international organizations;” (9) “Coordinating
plans and procedures for joint civilian-military operations with respect to stabilization and
reconstruction activities;” and (10) “Maintaining the capacity to field on short notice an
evaluation team to undertake on-site needs assessment.”
with the advice and consent of the Senate,” giving Congress power over the
appointment.  (Although the advise and consent power is generally invoked for
positions of Assistant Secretary and higher, in an analogous entry in 1998, Congress
added the position of Coordinator for Counterterrorism through P.L. 105-277,
Section 2301.  The Coordinator for Counterterrorism also holds the rank of
Ambassador-at-large and is appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate.) 
Section 706 also would assign 10 specific functions to S/CRS, which could have the
effect of clarifying its relationship to other executive departments and agencies.23
The codification would also prevent the dismantling of the office without the
legislative consent of Congress.        
Provide Authority and Funding for a Readiness Response Corps.
The Corps is to consist of two parts - an active duty component and a reserve
component.  The active duty component would be comprised of two groups with an
indeterminate total:   the first group would contain up to 250 people who are
specifically recruited, hired and trained to serve in the active duty corps, and the
second would be comprised of as many others as the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the AID Administrator, would designate from the ranks of State
and USAID personnel.  The reserve component, again of no definitive size,  would
be comprised of two sets of volunteers, trained and available as needed, whose names
are placed on a reserve roster.  The first group would be personnel from the State
Department (including foreign service nationals), USAID,  other executive agencies,
and the legislative and judicial branches.  A second group of at least 500 names
would be listed on the reserve roster; these could be retired Federal Government
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employees, contractor personnel, nongovernmental organization personnel, and State
and local government personnel with the appropriate training and skills.  No more
than 100 people at a time could be contracted under personal services contracts for
a stabilization and reconstruction operation, except that experts and consultants could
be employed for up to 60 days without regard to other requirements for employment
to assist in stabilization and reconstruction.  Members of executive agencies,
uniformed services, and employees of State and local government could be employed
on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis to assist with the work.   Within three
years of enactment of this provision into law, at least 10 percent of State Department
and USAID employees in the United States would have to be either (1) members of,
(2) trained to undertake the activities of, or (3) identified for potential deployment in
support of the Response Readiness Corps. 
Provide Broad Authority for Conducting Post-Conflict Response
Operations.  Section 705 would amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended (FAA) by providing broad authority for the President to furnish assistance
through U.S. civilian agencies or non-Federal employees for the stabilization and
reconstruction of a country or region in or in transition from conflict or civil strife.
The assistance could be provided notwithstanding any other provision of law except
the provision of FAA Section 614(a)(3), which requires the President to consult with
and provide a written policy justification to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
(now International Relations), the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and the
Appropriations committee of each chamber.  Section 705 would also waive the
percentage and dollar limitations on U.S. government drawdowns of commodities
and services for unforeseen emergencies contained in FAA Section 552(c)(2) and on
the transfer between accounts contained in FAA Section 610 and on the use of funds
and foreign services  authorized under the FAA Arms Export Control Act, as well as
sales authorized under the latter, as provided for by FAA Section 614.     
Provide Authority for the Establishment of an Emergency Fund.
Section 705 would also authorize the establishment of a $100 million fund, as well
as its automatic replenishment each fiscal year, for stabilization and reconstruction
activities.  Funds could be spent without regard to any provision of law except FAA
Section 614(a)(3).  (The 108th Congress turned down five Administration requests for
the creation of a $100 million emergency crisis response fund, as now proposed in
S. 209 and S. 600.  Conferees on the FY2005 consolidated appropriations bill, P.L.
108-447/H.R. 4818 deleted a Senate provision for $20 million in a no-year money,
State Department Crisis Response Fund.  Congress has long resisted the provision
of “blank check” pots of money as an abdication of constitutional appropriation and
oversight powers.  Nevertheless,  Congress has provided for such a mechanism in the
case of the automatically replenishable Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance
or ERMA emergency relief account.)    
Sense of Congress Provisions on Further Governmental
Reorganization.  Among the seven Sense of Congress statements contained in the
proposed legislation, two concern the reorganization of the U.S. government to better
plan for and conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations.  One states that the
President should establish a new National Security Council directorate to oversee the
development of interagency contingency plans and procedures for such operations.
The other states that the president should establish a standing committee, to be
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chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to ensure the
appropriate coordination of stabilization and reconstruction policy development and
implementation.  Members of the committee would include the heads of the State
Department, USAID, and the departments of Labor, Commerce, Justice, the
Treasury, Agriculture, and Defense, and other agencies as appropriate.
Expand Permitted Police Training.  U.S. assistance to train foreign police
forces is substantially circumscribed by Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, as amended (codified as Section 2420 of  Title 22 of the U.S. Code).
Section 660 prohibits U.S. assistance to train foreign police with certain exceptions.
In 1974, Congress enacted the prohibition, with limited exemptions for certain
assistance by the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, in reaction to reports of U.S. police trainers acquiescing or
participating in human rights abuses abroad. Five further exemptions were added
beginning in 1985 - one of them, added in 2000, permits police training “with respect
to assistance provided to reconstitute civilian police authority and capability in the
post-conflict restoration of host nation infrastructure” and to provide professional
training in international recognized standards of human rights, the rule of law, anti-
corruption, and the promotion of civilian police roles that support democracy.  S. 600
proposes three new exemptions which would facilitate training for post-conflict
needs:  assistance to combat corruption through good governance programs (FAA
Section 133), to combat trafficking in persons, and for “constabularies or comparable
law enforcement authorities in support of developing capabilities for and deployment
to peace operations.”
